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Abstract 
In most OECD countries the gap between rich and poor has widened over the past decades. This paper 
analyzes whether and to what extent taxes and social transfers have contributed to this trend. Has the 
redistributive power of different social programs changed over time? The paper contributes to the 
literature by disentangling several parts of fiscal redistribution in a comparative setting.  
We use micro-data from the Luxembourg Income Study to examine household market inequality, 
redistribution from transfers and taxes, and the underlying social programs that drive the changes, for 20 
countries from the mid-1980s to mid-2000s. The contribution of each program is estimated using a 
sequential accounting budget incidence decomposition technique. The aim of this paper is to offer detailed 
information on the redistributive impact of social transfer programs. We focus on changes in fiscal 
redistribution of 13 different social programs and taxes. 
We observe a sizeable increase in primary household inequality in all 20 countries over the last 25 years 
(except Ireland). In most countries, the extent of redistribution has increased too. Tax-benefit systems 
have offset two-third of the average increase in primary income inequality, although they appear to have 
become less effective in doing so since the mid-1990s.  
We find that the public old age pensions and the survivors scheme attribute 60 percent to the increase of 
redistribution during the period 1985-2005 for a subset of countries considered (with full tax/benefit 
information). Social assistance accounts for 20 percent, and the benefits for sickness, disease, and 
disability account for around 13 percent of the total increase in redistribution. Other transfers (invalid 
career benefits, education benefits, child care cash benefits and other child and family benefits) account 
for 22 percent of the total increase in redistribution. On the contrary, taxes slowed down redistribution by 
17 percent during 1985-2005. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Two OECD studies Growing Unequal? (2008) and Divided We Stand (2011) show that in 
most countries income inequality rose and the extent of redistribution by public cash 
transfers and income taxes and social security contribution has increased too over the 
period mid 1980s - mid 2000s as a whole. The tax-benefit system has offset rising 
market income inequality to some extent, but not fully. This paper contributes to the 
literature by disentangling several parts of fiscal redistribution in a comparative setting. 
To what extent has the redistributive power of different social programs changed over 
time?  
The overall tendency over the past two or three decades has been for an increase in 
income inequality in the large majority of rich nations.1 In OECD countries, the widening 
of the income distribution has been mainly driven by greater inequality in market income 
from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. Market income inequality also rose from the mid-
1990s to the mid-2000s, but at a slower pace (OECD, 2008 and 2011). Several 
explanations of income inequality have been introduced by comparative researchers in 
sociology, economics, and political science. 2  One of the main driving forces behind 
disposable income distribution is the reduction of inequality through the tax-transfer 
system.3 The overall redistributive effect can be divided into redistribution by transfers 
and by taxes, or even into more details.4 In the mid-2000s, the average redistributive 
effect achieved by public cash transfers is twice as large as that achieved through 
household taxes, although for example the United States stands out for achieving a 
greater part of redistribution by taxes (OECD, 2008 and 2011; Whiteford, 2010, Wang 
and Caminada, 2011; and Wang et al, 2012). As the tax and transfer system was only 
able to offset a part of this rise in market income inequality over the last 25 years, 
disposable income (i.e. after taxes and social benefits) has also become more unequal in 
many countries. 
This paper examines changes in the redistributive effects of taxation and income 
transfers to households in detail. Former, extensive literature on "welfare state 
retrenchment" that has emerged over the last decades seems to imply that welfare states 
have become less redistributive. Recent studies and data, to the contrary, show that 
most welfare states became more redistributive in the 1980s and 1990s (see also 
Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2005). Welfare states have not compensated completely for 
the rise in inequality of market income among households, but most have done so to 
some degree. By and large, welfare states have worked the way they were designed to 
work. It is markets, not redistribution policies, that have become more inegalitarian. It 
should be noted here that because tax-benefit system are generally progressive, one 
                                                 
1 Among others Chen et al (2011) and Brandolini and Smeeding (2009). 
2  Among others Kuznets (1955), Blinder and Esaki (1978), Blank and Blinder (1986), Harrison and 
Bluestone (1988), Blank and Card (1993), Nielsen and Alderson (1997), Gustafsson and Johansson (1999), 
Mocan (1999), Morris and Western (1999), Chevan and Stokes (2000), McCall (2001). 
3 Among others Danziger et al (1981), O’Higins et al (1990), Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997, 1998 and 
2000), Ervik (1998), Atkinson and Brandolini (2001), Smeeding (2000, 2004 and 2008), Caminada and 
Goudswaard (2001, 2002, 2005, 2009 and 2010), Caminada et al (2012), Atkinson (2003), Brady (2004), 
Brandolini and Smeeding (2007a and 2007b), Heisz (2007). 
4 Among others Plotnick (1984), Ferraini and Nelson (2003), Caminada and Goudswaard (2001 and 2002), 
Kristjánsson (2011), Fuest et al (2010), Paul (2004), Chen et al (2011), Wang and Caminada (2011).  
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could expect that higher market income inequality automatically leads to more 
redistribution, even without policy actions (Immervoll and Richardson, 2011). 
Under the circumstance of increasing income inequality and public expenditure cuts in the 
1980s and 1990s, attention needs to be paid to the design of welfare states. How good is 
the tax-benefit system as a whole and its programs in narrowing income distribution? 
What is the trend of redistribution over time?  
In a recent study, Immervoll and Richardson (also published in OECD, 2011) examine the 
impact of tax and transfer systems on income inequality in the past 25 years across 
countries. They find that in most countries tax-benefit policies offset some of the large 
increases in market income inequality, although they appear to have become less 
effective at doing so since the mid-1990s. Until the mid-1990s, tax-benefit systems in 
many LIS countries offset more than half of the rise in market income inequality. 
However, while market income inequality continued to rise after the mid-1990s, the 
redistributive effect of taxes and benefits on household income inequality declined. As a 
result, tax-benefit systems are now less effective at reducing inequality compared to the 
mid-1990s. After the mid-1990s, reduced redistribution has been the main driver of 
widening income gaps. However, the analysis of Immervoll and Richardson (2011) does 
not cover the total population, but is restricted to the working-age population. They 
exclude the largest government transfer program, public pensions. Especially this 
program has a strong redistributive impact ( Wang et al, 2012) 
This paper elaborates on the work of Immervoll and Richardson (2011) and on Jesuit and 
Mahler (2004 and 2006). Jesuit and Mahler divide government redistribution into several 
components: the redistributive effects from unemployment benefits, pensions, and taxes, 
and performed an empirical exercise for 13 countries with LIS-data around the years 
1999/2000. Their study provided relatively new insights. However, the data used are not 
very recent, the number of countries is rather small and only two specific social programs 
are included in the analysis. Moreover, their analysis was restricted to one moment in 
time (around 1999). In this paper we will make further steps on these points.  
In our paper we compute the changes in the redistributive effects of different social 
programs and taxes over time among the total population. This is meant as an extension 
of previous work (Wang and Caminada, 2011; and Wang et al, 2012). At the program 
level, we examine the redistributional trends of sickness benefits, disability benefits, state 
old age and survivors benefits, child/family benefits, unemployment compensation 
benefits, social assistance cash benefits, other social insurance benefits, mandatory 
payroll taxes and income taxes. We use the data from Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) 
and analyze the tax-benefit distributional effects across 20 LIS countries from the mid-
1980s to the mid-2000s. The redistributive effect of each program is measured 
sequentially using a budget incidence approach. Our contribution to the literature is that 
we provide trends of the redistribution across countries at program level. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides our research method and data. 
Section 3 presents the results of a cross country comparison. In section 4 we decompose 
total redistribution through the tax-benefit system into the redistributive effects of 11 
social transfers and several taxes from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s in a comparative 
setting. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. Research method 
 
2.1 Data from Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) 
The growing interest in national and cross-national differences in earnings and income 
inequality (over time) has produced a wide range of studies (see Gottschalk and Smeeding, 
1997; Brandolini and Smeeding, 2007; OECD, 2008 and 2011; Lambert et al, 2010 and 
Immervoll and Richardson, 2011). An important development has been the launching of 
LIS in which micro datasets from various countries have been "harmonised".5 Consequently 
it is possible to study income inequality across countries, and over time (see Atkinson et 
al, 1995). LIS micro data seems to be the best available data for describing how income 
inequality and the redistributive effects of taxes and transfers vary across countries, and 
over time (Nolan and Marx, 2009; Smeeding, 2008). 
There exist several detailed national studies of redistribution trends. International 
comparisons tend to focus on specific parts of the tax-benefit system. Multi-country 
comparative studies that consider the entire tax-benefit system are rare (Immervoll and 
Richardson, 2011). Point-in-time comparisons are sometimes thought problematic since 
large institutional differences between countries, notably in terms of the balance between 
public and private provision or cash transfers versus benefits in-kind, make it difficult to 
interpret country differences in terms of a particular portion of the redistribution system. 
However, this is less of an issue when we focus on comparing changes across countries, 
as overall institutional setups (as well as measurement choices in the underlying data) 
tend to vary less over time than they do cross-nationally. 
From nearly 300 variables in the LIS dataset, we choose those related to household 
income (all kinds of income sources), total number of persons in a household and 
household weight (in order to correct sample bias or non-sampling errors) to measure 
income inequality and redistribution across countries. In line with LIS convention and the 
work of Mahler and Jesuit (2006), we have eliminated observations with zero or a missing 
value of disposable income from LIS data. We use the Gini coefficient as an overall 
measure of income inequality.6 Household weights are applied for the calculation of Gini 
coefficients, the equivalence scale is the square root of the number of household 
members (LIS’ equivalence scale). Another measurement decision made in this paper 
concerns top and bottom coding. We bottom code datasets at 1 per cent of equivalized 
mean income and top code at 10 times the median of non-equivalized income for the 
nation sample (cf. Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997:661). This procedure limits the effect 
of extreme values at either end of the income distribution. 
 
                                                 
5 See survey information LIS at http://www.lisdatacenter.org/.  
6  It could be argued that the Gini coefficient is rather sensitive to the middle part of the income 
distribution compared to other indicators. E.g. Atkinson’s index (α=1.0) and Mean Log Deviation are 
relatively more sensitive to the changes in the lower tail of the income distribution. For this reason, we did 
a sensitivity analysis for several global indicators of income inequality; see Annex A. All indicators follow 
the same pattern at one moment in time (for different countries) with the largest redistribution given by 
Mean Log Deviation and the lowest redistribution given by the Atkinson’s index (α=0.5). In most cases the 
empirical results on redistribution do not alter using a specific global income inequality indicator. However, 
especially if a social program is targeted towards a certain group, for instance to the lower tail of the 
income distribution, the result vary slightly, depending on the indicators used. 
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2.2 Measuring the redistributive effects of taxes and social transfers 
Usually, the impact of social policy on income inequality is calculated in line with the work 
of Musgrave, Case and Leonard (1974), i.e. statutory or budget incidence analysis. A 
standard analysis of the redistributive effect of taxes and income transfers is to compare 
pre-tax-transfer income inequality and post-tax-transfer income inequality (OECD 2011: 
268). Our measure of the redistributive impact of social security on inequality is 
straightforwardly based on formulas developed by Kakwani (1986) and Ringen (1991): 
 
Redistribution by taxes and social transfers =  primary income inequality − disposable 
income inequality 
 
This formula is used to estimate the reduction in inequality produced by taxes and social 
transfers, where primary income inequality is given by a summary statistic of pre-tax, 
pre-transfer incomes and disposable income inequality is given by the same summary 
statistic of disposable equivalent incomes. When calculating inequality indices for both 
primary and disposable income, people are ranked by their primary and disposable 
incomes respectively, so that the re-ranking effect is included in our results (see Plotnick, 
1984; the same method is applied by Immervoll and Richardson, 2011 and by Wang and 
Caminada, 2011).  
Table 1 presents the framework for accounting income inequality and redistribution 
through various income sources. 
 
Table 1 The income inequality and redistribution accounting framework 
Income components Income inequality and redistributive effect 
Gross wages and salaries + Self-employment income + cash 
property income + Occupational and private pensions + 
Private transfers + Other cash income = 
Primary income 
Income inequality before social 
transfers and taxes 
+ Social security cash benefits -/- Redistributive effect of social transfers 
= Gross income = Income inequality before taxes 
-/- Pay Roll (Mandatory payroll taxes) 
-/- Income taxes 
-/- Redistributive effect of taxes 
= Disposable income 
= Income inequality after social 
transfers and taxes 
 
Note: For 12 countries (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States), full information is available of the entire 
tax-benefit system in LIS. For another 8 countries (Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, 
Poland and Spain), we use net wages and salaries instead of gross wages and salaries where gross 
variables are not available for all data years in LIS. 
 
Source: Wang and Caminada (2011) 
 
The budget incidence analysis is not without problems; see a critical survey of efforts to 
measure budget incidence by Smolensky et al (1987). The pre-transfer inequality is 
compared to the post-transfer inequality keeping all other things equal – namely, 
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assuming unchanged household and labor market structures, thus disregarding any 
possible behavioral changes that the situation of absence of social transfers would involve 
(Frick et al, 2000; Palme, 1996). However, behavioral responses may obviously be 
important. It is likely that in the absence of social transfers more people will work (more) 
thereby earning higher incomes. Kim (2000b) showed that both the generosity and 
efficiency of the tax/transfer system may influence the level of pre-tax-transfer income 
inequality. Budget incidence calculations can therefore only be seen as an approximation 
of the redistributive effects because the assumption that agents behave similar in 
situations with and without social transfers and social security. This implies that 
estimates for redistribution through taxes and transfers should be regarded as upper 
bounds. Despite this problem, analyses on statutory and budget incidence can be found 
for decades in literature on public finance.7  
It should be noted that our analysis captures, but does not isolate the direct effect of 
policy reforms. Showing the direct effects of policy reforms on measured redistribution 
requires holding everything else constant. A way to identify the relative contribution of 
policy changes and automatic effects of trends in market income inequality on 
redistribution would be to calculate tax burdens and benefit entitlements for 
representative samples of households for different periods. Unfortunately, such an 
analysis is currently not feasible for a larger group of countries as the required 
microsimulation models are not readily available (OECD, 2011: 288-289).  
With respect to the inequality measure we use the Gini coefficient. The change in the Gini 
between pre- and post-government income reflects redistribution through taxes and 
transfers. The Gini coefficient of equivalized disposable household income is often used as 
a summary measure of income distribution. The Gini coefficient lies between 0 (no 
inequality) and 1 (maximum inequality). 
We sequentially decompose the Gini coefficient in order to calculate the partial 
redistributive impact of transfers and taxes; see Wang and Caminada (2011) for details. 
The results obtained for the specific transfers and taxes are corrected for the ordering 
effect.8  
The sequential accounting decomposition approach has been, among others, advocated 
by Kakwani (1986) and is also followed by Mahler and Jesuit (2004) and Mahler and 
Jesuit (2006), Immervoll et al (2005) and Whiteford (2008). Other techniques of the 
decomposition of the Gini coefficient by income source can be found in the literature as 
well; see e.g. Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), Stark et al (1986), Kim (2000a). In the 
literature two techniques of decomposing inequality are distinguished; the sequential 
accounting decomposition and the factor source decomposition approach. When 
comparing both approaches, they lead to the same estimates of disposable income 
                                                 
7  See for example Musgrave and Tun Thin (1948), Gillespie (1965), Kakwani (1977), Reynolds and 
Smolenskey (1977), Mitchell (1991) and OECD (2008 and 2011). 
8  The ordering of programs has influence on the results when using the sequential accounting 
decomposition method. The partial redistributive effect of a specific social transfer will be highest (smallest) 
when computed as the first (last) social program. We corrected for this effect as follows. We consider every 
specific social transfer as the first program to be added to primary income and every direct tax as the first 
tax to be subtracted from gross income. In that case, the sum of all partial redistributive effects amounts to 
(a little) over 100 percent. So we rescaled the redistributive effects of each program by applying an 
adjustment factor, which is defined as the overall redistribution (100%) divided by the sum of all partial 
redistributive effects of all programs (a little over 100%). 
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inequality, but to contradictory results with respect to the importance of benefits for 
redistributing income (see Fuest et al, 2010). Inequality analysis based on the sequential 
accounting decomposition approach (as applied in this paper) suggests that benefits are 
the most important factor in reducing inequality in the majority of countries. The factor 
source decomposition approach, initiated by Shorrocks (1982), however, suggests that 
benefits play a much smaller role, while taxes and social contributions are more 
important contributors to income inequality reduction. Fuest et al (2010) explain these 
partly contradictory results. The most important difference between the two approaches 
is that the accounting approach applies tax benefit instruments sequentially, whereas the 
decomposition approach accounts for them simultaneously. See also Kammer et al 
(2012). We follow the sequential decomposition approach, which fits in a strand of 
empirical literature, among which the recent OECD-work.  
 
2.3 Measuring change over time 
In line with Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005), we believe that it is more informative to 
measure changes in inequality in absolute terms (the ending value minus the beginning 
value) rather than in percentage terms (absolute change divided by the beginning value). 
This issue arises as well when we compare redistribution at any given point in time. We 
adopt an absolutist approach by measuring absolute change in inequality.  
Absolute measures of change may be easier to interpret than relative measures. For 
example, suppose that taxation and transfers reduce inequality by the same amount in 
two countries that have different distributions of market income. When the change is 
measured in relative terms, we observe a larger reduction of inequality in the country 
with the more equal distribution of market incomes. “Do we really want to say that the 
welfare state in the country with the more egalitarian distribution of market income is 
more redistributive?” (Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2005: 450). These problems with 
relative measures are especially complex when we compare changes over time in 
redistribution, since the relative measure becomes "percentage change in percentage 
change." It is straightforward to measure redistribution as the absolute difference 
between inequality before and after taxes and transfers, and to measure change in 
redistribution as the difference in these amounts between two points in time.  
 
2.4 Focus on total population – including public pension schemes 
This paper extends and deepens the analyses of both Immervoll and Richardson (2011) 
and Wang et al (2011), using the tax-benefit models across countries over time to show 
the combined redistributive effects of taxes and transfer systems. It attempts to gauge 
the effects of several taxes and benefits over a longer time period and for as many 
countries as data permit. 
Unlike most existing studies, it explicitly focuses on the total population, and not to the 
non-elderly population (those aged 15-64).9  Indeed, restricting the analysis to the non-
elderly would avoid some of the problems inherent to comparisons of incomes between 
                                                 
9 Tony Atkinson gave some helpful comments on the choice of different age groups. He supported our idea 
to take the total population into account (LIS Summer Workshop 2012). The definition of working age 
population is open to debate because of  growing late retirement, so the range of working-age population is 
not easy to decide. 
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people who are at different stages in their lives. For instance, an essential function of old-
age pensions is to redistribute intertemporally over the life cycle; in that case a focus on 
the non-elderly helps in understanding the most important elements of interpersonal 
redistribution. However, we believe that in our analysis the largest government transfer 
program, public pensions, can not be excluded. Public pension plans are generally seen 
as part of the safety net, generating large antipoverty effects. So, state old-age pension 
benefits will be included in our analysis on redistribution. But countries differ to a large 
extent in public versus private provision of their pensions (OECD, 2008:120). 
Occupational and private pensions are not redistributive programs per se, although they 
too have a significant effect on redistribution when pre-tax-transfer inequality and post-
tax-transfer inequality are measured at one moment in time, particularly among the 
elderly.10 The standard approach treats contributions to government pensions as a tax 
that finances the retirement pensions paid out in the same year, while contributions to 
private pensions are effectively treated as a form of private consumption. This may affect 
international comparisons of redistribution effects of social transfers and taxes. 
Overcoming this bias requires a choice: should pensions be earmarked as market income 
or as a transfer? We deal with this bias rather pragmatically by following the LIS 
Household Income Variables List: occupational and private pensions are earmarked and 
treated as market income. 
It should be noted that our results could be biased by the focus on the total population 
instead of non-elderly population (those aged 15-64). Income redistribution among the 
total population is higher compared to the redistribution within the working-age 
population. However, the correlation between inequality (and redistribution) of total 
population and inequality (and redistribution) of working-age population is rather high; 
see Figure 1. Figure 1 (panel a) plots Gini coefficients of primary income and disposable 
incomes for both population groups; panel (b) plots figures for redistribution for both 
population groups. This suggests that focusing on the total population will not give a 
strong bias. 
 
                                                 
10 See Van Vliet et al (2012) for such an analysis. Preferably, however, the redistributive effects of 
occupational and private pensions should be analyzed on a life time basis. 
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Figure 1  Linkage income inequality total population and working-age 
population (15-65) across 36 LIS countries, mid-2000s 
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Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011), and own calculations 
 
2.5 Country selection 
In empirical studies, the selection of countries and data-years differ due to the 
consideration of data quality and data availability. We apply a cross-national analysis 
using comparable income surveys for most countries in the LIS data base. LIS data 
contains information for 36 countries for one or more data years (from wave 0 to wave 
VI), allowing researchers to make comparisons in a straightforward manner, and the 
information is still updating and expanding. This paper uses the data of 20 LIS countries, 
with at least three data points (around 1985, 1995 and 2005).11 We distinguish two 
groups of countries (based on data quality): 
o Countries for which full information is available on the whole trajectory from 
primary income to disposable income (12 countries): Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Israel, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States.12 
o For another 8 countries data is available only on an after-tax basis (we use net 
wages and salaries): Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, Poland, 
and Spain. 
 
 
                                                 
11  Namely Australia (1985, 1995, 2005), Belgium (1985, 1995, 2000), Canada (1987, 1994, 2004), 
Denmark (1987, 1995, 2004), Finland (1987, 1995, 2004), France (1981, 1994, 2005), Germany (1984, 
1994, 2004), Ireland (1987, 1995, 2004), Israel (1986, 1997, 2005), Italy (1986, 1995, 2004), Luxembourg 
(1985, 1994, 2004), Mexico (1984, 1996, 2004), the Netherlands (1983, 1994, 2004), Norway (1986, 1995, 
2004), Poland (1986, 1995, 2004), Spain (1980, 1995, 2004), Sweden (1987, 1995, 2005), Switzerland 
(1982, 1992, 2004), the United Kingdom (1986, 1995, 2004), and the United States (1986, 1994, 2004). 
12 In line with Immervoll and Richardson (2011), we do not take Taiwan into consideration. 
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3. Empirical results 
 
3.1 Trends in the distribution of primary and disposable income in LIS countries 
This section reviews the evidence on cross national comparisons of primary and 
disposable income inequality across 20 nations over time. This section is mainly 
descriptive and relies on the empirical evidence from LIS for the levels of income 
inequality from around 1980 to the mid-2000s. The changes in inequality levels are 
illustrated by the Gini coefficients. In order to give a general idea, we cluster the 
countries around 1985, 1995, and 2005 respectively, showing the average trends of 
inequality and redistribution. We show country profiles for all 20 LIS countries later in 
Figure 2. 
Table 2 shows the 20 country-average trend of primary income and disposable income 
inequality from 1985 to 2005. This figure highlights some significant differences across 
periods in a general way. On average, income inequality increased markedly. This 
increase was stronger during the first decade. The widening of income gaps was driven 
by rising inequality in the distribution of primary income, which was partly offset by 
public cash transfers and households taxes. In the second decade, the rising of primary 
income inequality and disposable income inequality are in parallel.  
OECD (2011: 268-271) has indicated that market incomes of non-elderly people have 
become more unequal in most countries. Table 2 shows inequality trends for primary 
incomes (including any private transfers) and disposable incomes (primary incomes plus 
cash benefits minus income taxes) for the total population and confirm most, but not all 
findings of OECD (2011). Using the data reported in Table 2, averaging across countries, 
it can be shown that inequality of primary income has increased by 13% over a twenty-
year period across the countries shown. This is a substantial increase over a relatively 
short period of time.  
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Table 2 Trends in income inequality and redistribution 
 
 Gini Primary Income Gini Disposable Income Absolute Fiscal Redistribution 
  
around 
1985 
around
1995 
around
2005 
Change 
85-05 % 
around 
1985 
around
1995 
around
2005 
Change 
85-05 % 
around 
1985 
around
1995 
around
2005 
Change 
85-05 % 
Australia (85-03) 0.420 0.464 0.461 0.041 10 0.293 0.308 0.312 0.019 6 0.126 0.156 0.149 0.023 18 
Belgium (85-00) 0.414 0.462 0.542 0.128 31 0.227 0.266 0.279 0.052 23 0.187 0.195 0.263 0.076 41 
Canada (87-04) 0.393 0.424 0.433 0.040 10 0.288 0.289 0.318 0.030 11 0.105 0.136 0.114 0.010 9 
Denmark (87-04) 0.398 0.421 0.419 0.021 5 0.254 0.218 0.228 -0.026 -10 0.144 0.203 0.191 0.047 33 
Finland (87-04) 0.332 0.384 0.464 0.132 40 0.209 0.217 0.252 0.044 21 0.123 0.168 0.212 0.089 72 
France (81-05) 0.364 0.487 0.449 0.085 23 0.288 0.288 0.281 -0.007 -3 0.076 0.199 0.168 0.092 121 
Germany (84-04) 0.444 0.450 0.489 0.044 10 0.265 0.270 0.278 0.013 5 0.179 0.180 0.210 0.031 17 
Ireland (87-04) 0.500 0.493 0.490 -0.010 -2 0.328 0.336 0.312 -0.017 -5 0.172 0.157 0.178 0.006 4 
Israel (86-05) 0.449 0.474 0.491 0.041 9 0.308 0.336 0.370 0.062 20 0.142 0.139 0.121 -0.021 -15 
Italy (86-04) 0.425 0.454 0.503 0.078 18 0.306 0.338 0.338 0.032 10 0.119 0.116 0.165 0.046 38 
Luxembourg (85-04) 0.377 0.388 0.452 0.075 20 0.237 0.235 0.268 0.031 13 0.140 0.153 0.184 0.044 31 
Mexico (84-04) 0.446 0.487 0.476 0.031 7 0.445 0.477 0.458 0.013 3 0.001 0.010 0.018 0.017 2301 
Netherlands (83-04) 0.435 0.420 0.459 0.023 5 0.260 0.257 0.263 0.003 1 0.176 0.162 0.196 0.020 11 
Norway(86-04) 0.352 0.400 0.430 0.078 22 0.233 0.238 0.256 0.023 10 0.119 0.162 0.174 0.055 46 
Poland (86-04) 0.365 0.527 0.527 0.163 45 0.271 0.318 0.320 0.050 18 0.094 0.208 0.207 0.113 121 
Spain (80-04) 0.416 0.501 0.441 0.025 6 0.318 0.353 0.315 -0.003 -1 0.098 0.148 0.126 0.028 28 
Sweden (87-05) 0.428 0.460 0.442 0.013 3 0.218 0.221 0.237 0.019 9 0.211 0.239 0.205 -0.006 -3 
Switzerland (82-04) 0.381 0.376 0.395 0.015 4 0.309 0.307 0.268 -0.042 -13 0.071 0.068 0.128 0.056 79 
UK (86-04) 0.476 0.503 0.490 0.014 3 0.303 0.344 0.345 0.041 14 0.173 0.158 0.145 -0.028 -16 
USA (86-04) 0.434 0.473 0.482 0.047 11 0.338 0.365 0.372 0.034 10 0.096 0.108 0.109 0.013 14 
Mean-20 0.412 0.452 0.467 0.054 13 0.285 0.299 0.304 0.019 7 0.128 0.153 0.163 0.036 28 
Mean-12 0.412 0.437 0.454 0.043 10 0.273 0.281 0.292 0.018 7 0.139 0.157 0.163 0.024 17 
Mean-8 0.413 0.475 0.485 0.072 17 0.303 0.327 0.321 0.019 6 0.111 0.148 0.164 0.053 48 
 
Note: For 12 countries full tax and benefit information is available in LIS. For other 8 countries (marked italic) net wages and salaries are used because gross variables 
are not available for all data years in LIS. 
 
Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011), and own calculations 
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Primary-income inequality has been the main driver of inequality trends in disposable 
incomes, but did redistribution policies have a substantial effect as well? Between the 
mid-1980s and the mid-2000s, redistribution systems compensated two-third of the 
increase in primary-income inequality. The upwards trend in primary-income inequality 
continued after the mid-1990s, although at a lower rate. In absolute terms, redistribution 
increased across countries. Over the two decades as a whole, primary-income inequality 
rose by about 0.054, while redistribution rose 0.036. Taxes and transfers now reduce 
inequality by about 35%; more than in the mid-1980s (31%). 
 
Country-specific results are also presented in Table 2. Tax-benefit systems in Belgium13, 
Finland, Germany, Poland and Sweden achieve the greatest reduction in inequality, 
lowering the Gini value by 20 points or more in the mid-2000s, while the smallest 
redistributive effect is seen in Mexico, the United States and Canada (less than 12 points). 
Through the entire period, disposable income inequality became significantly larger in 
Belgium, Finland and Israel, whereas it decreased in Denmark, France, Ireland, Spain and 
Switzerland. In the period 1985-1995, higher disposable income inequality was mainly 
‘caused’ by higher primary income inequality (although primary income inequality 
declined in Ireland, the Netherlands and Switzerland). In this period, government 
redistribution has offset the widening of income gaps through public cash transfers and 
household taxes either in full (e.g. Canada, Denmark, France and Germany) or in part (in 
all others; see Figure 2).  
Cross-country variance is larger since the mid-1990s. Primary income inequality 
increased markedly in Belgium and Finland, and to a lesser extent in Germany, Israel, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, while it was almost stable in 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Poland and the United States. Primary income 
inequality decreased in France, Mexico, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom between 
1995 and 2005. Disposable income inequality increased in all countries except for France, 
Ireland, Mexico, Spain and Switzerland. A large part of this rise of income inequality was 
offset by redistribution through taxes and transfers. Israel is an outlier due to both 
increasing primary income inequality and declining redistribution since 1995, generating 
a relatively sharp increase in Israel’s’ disposable income inequality. 
 
In contrast to the results in Immervoll and Richardson (2011; also published in OECD, 
2011), we do not confirm their finding that tax-benefit policies have become less effective 
in redistribution since the mid-1990s when the total population (instead of the working-
age population) is taken into consideration. Among the total population both primary 
income inequality and redistribution continued to rise after the mid-1990s; we do not find 
that the fiscal redistribution effect of taxes and benefits on household income inequality 
stabilized (or declined). As a result, among the total population tax-benefit systems in 
the mid-2000s are even more effective at reducing inequality compared to the mid-1990s. 
So, the claim that reduced redistribution is a main driver of widening income gaps since 
                                                 
13 Belgium (2000) seems to be an outliner. We have noticed that there are many zeros of net wages and 
salaries in the dataset. 
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the mid-1990’s must be toned down. Moreover, our finding is a stimulus to analyze 
several programs (parts) of the redistribution system in more detail. 
Table 3 summarizes the results of Immervoll and Richardson (2011) for trends in the 
redistribution among the working-age population and our findings for the total population 
for 12 countries with full tax and benefit information for mid-1980s, mid-1990s and mid-
2000s. 
 
Table 3 Trends in redistribution among working-age and total population 
 
 
Total population 
 
Working-age population 
 
  
Immervoll and Richardson 
 
  
Gini 
primary 
income 
Gini 
disposable 
income 
Absolute 
redistri-
bution 
(Relative 
redistri-
bution) 
Gini 
primary 
income 
Gini 
disposable 
income 
Absolute 
redistri-
bution 
(Relative 
redistri-
bution) 
Mid-1980s 0.412 0.273 0.139 (33.7) 0.362 0.267 0.095 (26.4) 
Mid-1990s 0.437 0.281 0.157 (35.8) 0.392 0.274 0.117 (29.9) 
Mid-2000s 0.454 0.292 0.163 (35.8) 0.398 0.283 0.114 (28.7) 
         
Change 85-05 0.043 0.018 0.024  0.036 0.016 0.019  
Change 85-95 0.026 0.008 0.018  0.030 0.007 0.022  
Change 95-05 0.017 0.011 0.006  0.006 0.009 -0.003  
 
Note: For 12 countries full tax and benefit information is available in the LIS dataset.  
 
Source: Immervoll and Richardson (2011) and Wang and Caminada (2011) 
 
In contrast to Immervoll and Richardson (2011) and OECD (2011: 268-271), we find for 
the total population (instead of the non-elderly) that disposable incomes have become 
more equal over time in some countries: Denmark, France, Ireland, Poland and 
Switzerland. Finally, our analysis points at a lower level of redistribution among the total 
population around 2005 than it was around 1985 for Israel, Sweden and the United 
States. 
 
3.2 Redistributive effects of taxes and transfers over time  
Table 4 highlights that the trend of overall redistribution is mainly caused by transfers. 
From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, total redistribution increased, driven by the 
stronger redistributive effect of transfers. In the decade from the mid-1990s to the mid-
2000s, no change was observed in overall redistribution in the first five years, followed 
by a tiny increase from around the mid-2000s. Redistribution by taxes declined in the 
first five years, then increased up to the peak in 1995, followed by a continuous decline 
till the mid-2000s. The average total redistribution increased by 0.036 point in 20 LIS 
countries from around 1985 to around 2005. 
Figure 2 illustrates the trends of overall, tax and transfers redistribution for each 20 LIS 
country. In all countries, total redistribution was mainly driven by transfer redistribution. 
The redistribution achieved by public cash transfers was more than twice as large as that 
achieved through taxes, except for Canada, Israel, and the United States. 
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Table 4  Redistribution across 20 LIS countries over time 
 
 Redistribution Partial effects: change 1985-2005 
Country 
around 
1985 
around 
1995 
around 
2005 
Change 
1985-2005 
from  
transfers 
from  
taxes 
Australia (85-95-03) 0.126 0.156 0.149 0.023 0.030 -0.007 
Belgium (85-95-00) 0.187 0.195 0.263 0.076 0.014 0.063 
Canada (87-94-04) 0.105 0.136 0.114 0.010 0.007 0.003 
Denmark (87-95-04) 0.144 0.203 0.191 0.047 0.033 0.014 
Finland (87-95-04) 0.123 0.168 0.212 0.089 0.098 -0.009 
France (81-94-05) 0.076 0.199 0.168 0.092 0.075 0.017 
Germany (84-94-04) 0.179 0.180 0.210 0.031 0.023 0.008 
Ireland (87-95-04) 0.172 0.157 0.178 0.006 0.005 0.002 
Israel (86-97-05) 0.142 0.139 0.121 -0.021 0.000 -0.021 
Italy (86-95-04) 0.119 0.116 0.165 0.046 0.046 0.000 
Luxembourg (85-94-04) 0.140 0.153 0.184 0.044 0.007 0.037 
Mexico (84-96-04) 0.001 0.010 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.000 
Netherlands (83-94-04) 0.176 0.162 0.196 0.020 0.020 0.000 
Norway(86-95-04) 0.119 0.162 0.174 0.055 0.051 0.004 
Poland (86-95-04) 0.094 0.208 0.207 0.113 0.108 0.005 
Spain (80-95-04) 0.098 0.148 0.126 0.028 0.026 0.001 
Sweden (87-95-05) 0.211 0.239 0.205 -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 
Switzerland (82-92-04) 0.071 0.068 0.128 0.056 0.077 -0.021 
UK (86-95-04) 0.173 0.158 0.145 -0.028 -0.012 -0.015 
USA (86-94-04) 0.096 0.108 0.109 0.013 0.013 0.000 
Mean-20 0.128 0.153 0.163 0.036 0.032 0.004 
Mean-12 0.139 0.157 0.163 0.024 0.028 -0.004 
Mean-8 0.111 0.148 0.164 0.053 0.037 0.016 
 
Note: For 12 countries full tax and benefit information is available in LIS. For other 8 countries (marked 
italic) net wages and salaries are used because gross variables are not available for all data years in LIS. 
 
Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011), and own calculations 
 
From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, total redistribution increased in all countries 
except the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Redistribution by transfers also 
increased in all countries except Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
Redistribution achieved by the tax system fell in all countries but rose in Canada, 
Denmark, Finland and the United States.  
From the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s the patterns of redistribution across countries are 
more diverse, both in overall redistribution and in tax and transfers redistribution. In this 
decade, total redistribution fell in many countries but increased significantly in Belgium, 
Finland, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent in 
Ireland and Norway. The trends of transfer redistribution across countries followed the 
total redistribution pattern. However in Ireland and Luxembourg, the decrease of transfer 
redistribution did not lead to a decreasing total redistributive effect, because of the rising 
redistribution through the tax system in those countries. See figure 2. 
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Figure 2 Trends in inequality and redistribution in 20 LIS countries 
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Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011), and own calculations 
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Figure 2 Trends in inequality and redistribution in 20 LIS countries (continued) 
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Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011), and own calculations 
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Figure 2 Trends in inequality and redistribution in 20 LIS countries (final) 
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Note: For 12 countries full tax and benefit information is available in LIS. For other 8 countries (marked 
italic) net wages and salaries are used because gross variables are not available for all data years in LIS. 
 
Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011), and own calculations 
 
 
3.3 Program size and targeting of transfers 
Considering the redistributive effect of social benefits, a distinction can be made between 
programs’ size and the extent to which benefits are targeted toward low-income groups 
by means-testing. In a seminal paper by Korpi and Palme (1998: 663), they have posited 
a “paradox of redistribution” whereby “the more we target benefits to the poor . . . the 
less likely we are to reduce poverty and inequality.” The paradox arises from the fact that 
highly targeted programs have the support of a small and isolated political base. As they 
put it, targeted programs offer “no rational base for a coalition between those above and 
below the poverty line. In effect, the poverty line splits the working class and tends to 
generate coalitions between better-off workers and the middle class against the lower 
sections of the working class” (Korpi and Palme, 1998: 663). Comprehensive programs, 
on the other hand, even when they are organized according to social insurance principles, 
tend to encourage coalitions between the working and middle classes that leave low 
income groups less isolated. With this background in mind, it is useful to explore 
empirically these two aspects of transfers with reference to the LIS database. Is 
redistribution associated with transfers’ overall size or with their target efficiency? Is 
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there, as is often suggested, a tradeoff between the two? Using LIS micro data it is 
possible to calculate a measure of the average value of social transfers as a percentage 
of households’ pre-tax income: the larger the value, the greater the share of total income 
that is derived from transfers. It is also possible to calculate a summary index of the 
degree to which transfers are targeted toward low-income groups. This is done by 
applying Kakwani’s (1986) ‘index of concentration’ to transfers. This index takes on the 
value of -1.0 if the poorest person gets all transfer income, 0 if everybody gets an equal 
amount, and +1.0 if the richest person gets all transfer income (cf. Korpi and Palme, 
1998: 684). Figures for the size and target efficiency of social benefits are calculated for 
all 20 LIS countries and are reported in Table 5 for around 1985 and around 2005. 
 
Table 5  Budget size and targeting efficiency across 20 LIS countries over time 
 
  Budget size (%) Targeting 
Country 
around 
1985 
around 
2005 
Change 
around 
1985 
around 
2005 
Change 
Australia (85-03) 8.4 11.1 2.7 -0.376 -0.404 -0.028 
Belgium (85-00) 26.7 7.9 -18.8 -0.095 -0.244 -0.148 
Canada (87-04) 9.9 10.9 1.0 -0.230 -0.193 0.038 
Denmark (87-04) 18.4 18.9 0.5 -0.056 -0.306 -0.251 
Finland (87-04) 11.2 23.2 12.0 -0.221 -0.127 0.094 
France (81-05) 12.2 26.2 14.0 -0.119 0.077 0.196 
Germany (84-04) 17.0 21.2 4.2 -0.165 -0.110 0.056 
Ireland (87-04) 16.5 17.3 0.8 -0.218 -0.205 0.014 
Israel (86-05) 10.7 11.0 0.3 -0.191 -0.125 0.066 
Italy (86-04) 20.3 25.4 5.1 0.099 0.126 0.026 
Luxembourg (85-04) 22.5 23.4 0.9 0.032 0.035 0.003 
Mexico (84-04) 2.1 6.0 3.9 0.624 0.386 -0.238 
Netherlands (83-04) 17.7 21.3 3.5 -0.156 -0.041 0.114 
Norway(86-04) 12.6 20.2 7.7 -0.237 -0.155 0.082 
Poland (86-04) 15.2 32.5 17.3 -0.068 0.157 0.224 
Spain (80-04) 15.2 20.7 5.5 0.024 0.068 0.045 
Sweden (87-05) 26.9 24.6 -2.3 -0.015 -0.128 -0.113 
Switzerland (82-04) 6.5 17.5 11.1 -0.300 -0.066 0.235 
United Kingdom (86-04) 17.9 14.3 -3.6 -0.228 -0.313 -0.085 
United States (86-04) 7.2 9.9 2.7 -0.199 -0.060 0.138 
Mean-20 14.7 18.2 3.4 -0.105 -0.081 0.023 
Mean-12 13.7 17.0 3.3 -0.198 -0.169 0.029 
Mean-8 16.3 19.9 3.6 0.035 0.050 0.015 
 
Notes:  
- For 12 countries full tax and benefit information is available in LIS. For other 8 countries (marked italic) 
net wages and salaries are used because gross variables are not available for all data years in LIS. 
- As suggested by the LIS Staff and Louis Chauvel, the budget size of France around 1985 and Poland 
(1986) can be seen as outliners. Moreover, we think that figures for Belgium (2000) should be 
interpreted with cautious as well. 
 
Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011), and own calculations 
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There is considerable variance among countries in the average size of social benefits 
relative to total household income. In the mid-1980s, four countries (Belgium, Italy, 
Luxembourg and Sweden) achieve a high budget size of transfers (20% or more), 
followed by Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherland, Poland, Spain and the United 
Kingdom (above 15%), whereas it is low in Australia, Canada, Mexico, Switzerland, and 
the United States (less than 10%). In the mid-2000s, more countries achieve a high 
budget size (20% or over), namely Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherland, Norway, Poland, Spain and Sweden, while Belgium, Mexico, and the United 
States have budget sizes less than 10%. Over time social benefits size increased in all 
countries, with exceptions for Belgium, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
Targeting efficiency is more diverse across countries. In the mid-1980s, cash benefits are 
most targeted to the poor in Australia and Switzerland (values less than -0.300), and 
more universally distributed in Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Spain and Sweden 
(values between -0.01 and +0.01). In the mid-2000s, Australia, Denmark and the United 
Kingdom targeted more to the poor than other countries (respectively -0.404, -0.306 and 
-0.313). Transfers were spread more universally in France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. Generally speaking, transfers are less targeted 
to the poor around 2005 than in earlier periods. 
 
 
4.  Decomposition of the redistributive effect of social transfers and taxes 
across LIS countries from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s 
 
How have the redistributive effects of the different parts of welfare states altered over 
time and across countries? This section shows trends of detailed redistributive effects 
across a selection of those 12 LIS countries with full information on taxes and benefits. 
We elaborate on the work of Mahler and Jesuit (2006), Immervoll and Richardson (2011) 
and OECD (2011). However, we refine their approach (see Wang and Caminada, 2011 
and Wang et al, 2012), decomposing the trajectory of the Gini coefficient from primary to 
disposable income inequality in several parts: we will distinguish 11 different social 
benefits, income taxes and social contributions in our empirical investigation. We 
calculate the following (partial) redistributive effects over time, based on the LIS 
household income components list: sickness benefits, occupational injury and disease 
benefits, disability benefits, state old-age and survivors benefits, child/family benefits, 
unemployment compensation benefits, maternity and other family leave benefits, 
military/veterans/war benefits, other social insurance benefits, social assistance cash 
benefits, near-cash benefits, mandatory payroll taxes and income taxes.  
As explained before, we consider state old-age pension benefits as part of our analysis, 
because they are part of the safety net and generate significant reduction in poverty and 
income inequality. Occupational and private pensions are not taken into account.  
To illustrate the idea of decomposition from primary to disposable income inequality, 
Table 6 reports the trends of redistributive effects of the different parts of tax-benefit 
system averaged for 12 LIS countries from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s. 14 
                                                 
14 It should be noted that our results are hardly affected by the ordering effect. The partial redistributive 
effect of a specific social transfer will be highest (smallest) when computed as the first (last) social 
program. A sensitivity analysis shows that changing the order of adding a specific benefit to primary 
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Table 6  Decomposition of disposable income inequality for 12 countries from 
the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s: averages by periods 
 
 
Gini 
around 
1985 
Gini 
around 
1995 
Gini 
around 
2005 
Change 
85-05 
(a) Gini primary income 0.412 0.437 0.454 +0.043 
(b) Gini disposable income 0.273 0.281 0.292 +0.018 
Overall redistribution (a-b) 0.139 0.157 0.163 +0.024 
     
Partial effects Share Share Share Change 
     
Transfers 71% 74% 78% +7 points 
Sickness benefits 1% 1% 2% +1 points 
Occupational injury and disease benefits a 6% 0% 1% -5 points 
Disability benefits b 5% 6% 8% +3 points 
State old-age and survivors benefits c 34% 33% 38% +4 points 
Child/family benefits d 6% 7% 6% +1 points 
Unemployment compensation benefits e 6% 8% 5% 0 points 
Maternity and other family leave benefits f 1% 1% 2% +1 points 
Military/veterans/war benefits 1% 1% 1% 0 points 
Other social insurance benefits g 3% 4% 3% 0 points 
Social assistance cash benefits h 9% 9% 9% 0 points 
Near-cash benefits i 1% 4% 3% +2 points 
     
Taxes 29% 26% 22% -7 points 
Mandatory payroll taxes j 1% 1% 0% -1 points 
Income taxes 28% 25% 22% -6 points 
     
Overall redistribution 100% 100% 100%   
a Short-term occupational injury and disease benefits, Long-term occupational injury and disease 
benefits; Occupational injury and disease benefits. 
b Disability pensions; Disability allowances; Disability benefits. 
c Universal old-age pensions; Employment-related old-age pensions; Old-age pensions for public sector 
employees; Old-age pensions.; Early retirement benefits; Survivors pensions; State old-age and 
survivors benefits. 
d Child allowances; Advance maintenance; Orphans allowances; Child/family benefits. 
e Unemployment insurance benefits; (Re)training allowances; Placement/resettlement benefits; 
Unemployment compensation benefits. 
f Wage replacement; Birth grants; Child care leave benefits; Maternity and other family leave benefits. 
g Invalid career benefits; Education benefits; Child care cash benefits; Other social insurance benefits. 
h General social assistance benefits; Old-age and disability assistance benefits; Unemployment 
assistance benefits; Parents assistance benefits; Social assistance cash benefits. 
i Near-cash food benefits; Near-cash housing benefits; Near-cash medical benefits; Near-cash heating 
benefits; Near-cash education benefits; Near-cash child care benefits; Near-cash benefits. 
j Mandatory contributions for self-employment; Mandatory employee contributions. 
 
Note: 12-country-average; Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Israel, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
 
Source: own calculations based on LIS 
                                                                                                                                                 
income (or subtracting tax from gross income) does change the partial effect of this transfer (or tax) in 
total redistribution only slightly. In case we consider a specific social transfer as the last (instead of the 
first) program to be added to primary income distribution, the computed partial redistributive effect 
changes up to 1%-point at the highest. 
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From a policy perspective, comparisons of absolute changes in redistribution are often 
more appealing than comparisons of shares (see section 2.3). Figure 3 highlights 
differences in redistributive effects of 13 transfers and taxes on the average level of 12 
LIS countries across different periods.  
 
Figure 3  Trends in the redistributive effects of 13 types of transfers and taxes 
for 12 countries (point changes in the Gini coefficient) 
 
 
Transfers 
T1 
T2 
T3 
T4 
T5 
T6 
T7 
T8 
T9 
T10 
T11 
Taxes 
T12 
T13 
  
 
 
T1 Sickness benefits  
T2  Occupational injury and disease benefits 
T3  Disability benefits 
T4  State old age and survivors benefits 
T5  Child / family benefits 
T6  Unemployment compensation benefits 
T7  Maternity and other family leave benefits 
 
T8  Military / veterans / war benefits 
T9  Other social insurance benefits 
T10 Social assistance cash benefits 
T11 Near cash benefits 
T12 Mandatory payroll taxes 
T13 Income taxes 
 
Source: own calculations based on LIS 
 
In the decade from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, the dominant pattern was that of 
more redistribution. This was especially evident for state old age and survivors benefits 
(T4), to a lesser extent for disability benefits (T3), child and family benefits (T5), 
unemployment compensation benefits (T6), social assistance cash benefits (T10) and 
near cash benefits (T11). Less redistribution was generated by occupational jury and 
disease benefits (T2), mandatory payroll taxes (T12) and income taxes (T13). In this 
decade overall redistribution increased by 0.017 point for our 12-country-average. 
In the second decade between 1995 and 2005, redistribution as a whole was rather 
stable. We observe a moderate decline for child / family benefits (T5), unemployment 
compensation benefits (T6), military / veterans / war benefits, other social insurance 
benefits, near cash benefits (T11), mandatory payroll taxes (T12) and income taxes 
(T13). However, redistribution increased in this period rather strongly for state old age 
and survivors benefits (T4), and to a lesser extent for sickness benefits (T1), 
occupational injury and disease benefits (T2), disability benefits (T3), maternity and 
M id-1980s to  M id-1990s
-0.008 0.000 0.008 0.016
M id-1990s to  M id-2000s
-0.008 0.000 0.008 0.016
M id-1980s to  M id-2000s
-0.008 0.000 0.008 0.016
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other family leave benefits (T7) and social assistance cash benefits (T10). The average 
change in total redistribution during this decade was only 0.006 point. 
Over the entire period 1985-2005, there was more diversity in patterns. A significant 
increase of redistribution can be attributed to disability benefits (T3) and the state old 
age and survivors benefits (T4), whereas less redistribution comes via occupational jury 
and disease benefits (T2), mandatory payroll taxes (T12) and income taxes (T13). The 
cumulative change in total redistribution during the entire period was of around 0.024 
points. 
 
With respect to trends in the redistributive effects of several social programs across 
countries, the results are diverse. Figure 4 presents how the redistributive effect of each 
social program changed over time across 12 LIS countries. Here, we focus on only five 
grouped social transfer schemes and on taxes (see Annex B and Annex C for more 
details): 
o T4: state old-age and survivors benefits;  
o T1+T2+T3: benefits for sickness, occupational injury and disease, and disability; 
o T9+T10: social assistance cash benefits, near-cash benefits;  
o T6: unemployment compensation benefits;  
o Other transfers (child/family benefits, maternity and other family leave benefits, 
military/veterans/war benefits, other social insurance benefits); and 
o Taxes (income taxes and mandatory payroll taxes). 
 
Countries are ranked in order to their redistribution from highest to lowest. For example, 
Sweden ranks first in descending order of redistribution around 1985 and 1995, but ranks 
third around 2005. On the other extreme, Switzerland ranks at the bottom of our list of 
redistribution around 1985 and 1995, but climbs several places to rank ninth in 2004. 
The United States has the lowest redistribution in 2004.  
Note that Finland made remarkable progress over lime on the list, mainly due to 
(additional) redistribution by the public old age and survivors scheme. Finland ranked 
eighth around 1985, while it is on top of the list of redistributive welfare states around 
2005. 
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Figure 4  Decomposition of redistribution of social transfers and taxes in 12 LIS 
countries 1985-2005 
around 1985
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Norway 86
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UK 86
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around 1995
0.000 0.050 0.100 0.150 0.200 0.250
Switzerland 92
USA 94
Canada 94
Israel  97
Australia 95
UK 95
Norway 95
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around 2005
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State old age and survivors benefits attribute most to redistribution in the majority of the 
countries (around one third). From the mid-1980s to mid-1990s, the main pattern was a 
stable or declining contribution of these programs to redistribution, except for Canada, 
Denmark and Norway. In the last decade, the pattern changed: redistribution increased 
in eight countries and decreased in Canada, Norway and Sweden. The contribution of the 
old age and survivors program increased during this decade. Overall, state old age and 
survivors benefits account for around 60 percent of the total increase in redistribution 
among our 12-country-average between 1985 and 2005. 
Social assistance benefits, the main form of income support for jobseekers who are not 
qualifying for other benefits, represent a relatively high share of total redistribution 
comparing to other benefits because this program is specifically targeted to low-income 
groups. Higher levels of inequality reduction in the mid-1990s were achieved comparing 
to earlier years in all countries. During the period 1995-2005 redistribution only fell in 
Canada, Finland, Norway and Sweden. But in these countries regional or local authorities 
may also provide supplementary programs on top of those which are nationally 
coordinated, compensating partly for the declining redistribution. Overall, social 
assistance and near-cash benefits account for 20 percent of the total increase in 
redistribution among our 12-country-average between 1985 and 2005. 
The redistributive effect of benefits for sickness, occupational injury and disease, and 
disability varies across countries. Through the entire period, it has risen in Canada, 
German, and the United Kingdom, while it declined in the Netherlands and Norway. Other 
countries experienced an increase (decrease) before the mid-1990s and then a decrease 
(increase) until the mid-2000s. Overall, benefits for sickness, occupational injury and 
disease, and disability account for around 13 percent of the total increase in 
redistribution among our 12-country-average between 1985 and 2005. 
During the first decade the redistributive effect of unemployment compensation benefits 
increased in most countries except for the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, while it 
declined slightly in most countries in the period 1995-2005 (with the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and the United States as exceptions). The overall contribution of 
unemployment benefits to the total increase in redistribution among our 12-country-
average between 1985 and 2005 is modest. 
Among the other transfers, we have to mention a sharp increase in redistribution for 
Australia and Sweden in the period 1985-1995 due to invalid career benefits, education 
benefits, child care cash benefits and other child and family benefits in those countries. 
This variety of family-related benefits accounts for 22 percent of the total increase in 
redistribution among our 12-country-average between 1985 and 2005. 
Taxes attributed less to redistribution in the period 1985-2005 on average. However, 
cross-country differences are large. Changes in the redistributive effect of taxes may be 
caused by tax reforms. Tax reforms did have several aspects. Income taxes became 
more progressive in Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway – consistent with 
the trend towards greater primary-income inequalities, which, in itself, would increase 
taxation at the top end. Reforms that have broadened the tax base may also have 
resulted in some tax-burden increases for higher-income groups. Effective income-tax 
rates faced by households, on average, have, however, declined in Australia, Finland, 
Israel, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. In these countries the effect of 
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flattening of the rate structures has been accompanied by lower tax burdens resulting in 
lower redistributive capacity of taxes.  
 
Table 7 summarizes our results of the decomposition of the change in disposable income 
inequality across 12 countries during the period 1985-205. 
 
Table 7  Components of change in disposable income inequality for 12 countries 
from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s 
 
 
Gini 
around 
1985 
Gini 
around 
2005 
Change 
85-05 
 
(a) Gini primary income 0.412 0.454 +0.043  
(b) Gini disposable income 0.273 0.292 +0.018  
Overall redistribution (a-b) 0.139 0.163 +0.024 = 100 
o State old-age and survivors 
benefits 
  +0.015 60  
o Social assistance cash and near 
benefits 
  +0.005 20 
o Benefits for sickness, occupational 
injury and diseases 
  +0.003 13 
o Unemployment compensation 
benefits  
  +0.001 2 
o Other transfers a   +0.005 22 
o Taxes   -0.004 -17 
 
a Child/family benefits, maternity and other family leave benefits, military/veterans/war benefits, other 
social insurance benefits. 
 
Source: own calculations based on LIS 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Different welfare systems and different social policies lead to various outcomes in 
changes of income inequality. This paper investigates income distribution and 
redistribution attributed to social transfers and taxes across 20 LIS countries from around 
1985 to the mid-2000s, based on the micro household income data from LIS. We have 
provided trends of primary and disposable income inequality, overall and disaggregated 
redistributions by social programs in a comparative way, across much more countries 
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than that have been studied before, offering an accurate, detailed picture of redistribution 
of incomes through taxes and transfers across social welfare states. 
We have applied a sequential budget incidence analysis and find that the welfare states 
on average reduce inequality by one third around 2005. Social benefits have a much 
stronger redistributive impact than taxes. As far as social programs are concerned, public 
pensions account for the largest reduction in income inequality, although the pattern is 
diverse across countries. To a lesser extent, social assistance, disability and family 
benefits also contribute to smaller income disparities. 
We observe a sizeable increase in primary household inequality in all 20 countries over 
the last 25 years with the exception of Ireland. In most countries, the extent of 
redistribution has increased as a whole too. Tax-benefit systems offset two-third of the 
increase in primary income inequality, although they appear to have become less 
effective in doing so since the mid-1990s.  
Our approach differs from earlier studies in that the total population is taken into 
consideration, in stead of the working-age population only. In contrast to the results in 
OECD (2011) and Immervoll and Richardson (2011), we do not find that tax-benefit 
policies have become less effective in redistribution since the mid-1990s. Among the total 
population both primary income inequality and redistribution continued to rise after the 
mid-1990s; we do not find that the fiscal redistribution effect of taxes and benefits on 
household income inequality stabilized (or declined). As a result, the tax-benefit systems 
in the mid-2000s are even more effective at reducing inequality compared to the mid-
1990s. So, the claim that reduced redistribution is a main driver of widening income gaps 
since the mid-1990’s must be toned down.  
We find that within rising overall redistribution, the public old age pensions and the 
survivors scheme attribute 60 percent to the increase of redistribution during the entire 
period 1985-2005. Social assistance accounts for 20 percent, and the benefits for 
sickness, occupational injury and disease, and disability account for around 13 percent of 
the total increase in redistribution among our 12-country-average. Other transfers 
(invalid career benefits, education benefits, child care cash benefits and other child and 
family benefits) account for 22 percent of the total increase in redistribution. On the 
contrary, taxes slowed down redistribution by 17 percent during 1985-2005. 
This empirical analysis does not show why benefits and taxes have become more or less 
redistributive. It can be expected that, as market income inequality rises, the tax-benefit 
systems will automatically have a more redistributive impact, because of the 
progressivity built into these systems. But also policy chances will certainly explain a part 
of the changes in redistribution. Future research should shed some light on the impact of 
specific policy reforms in changing the redistributive effect of welfare states. 
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Annex A Sensitivity analysis for redistribution using different global income 
inequality indicators 
 
Literature shows that different indicators of income inequality are sensitive to different 
parts of the income distribution.15 In order to offer a broader picture of the redistributive 
effect of income transfers, we not only use the Gini coefficient, but also other widely used 
indicators, namely Atkinson’s index (α=1.0 and α=0.5), Mean Log Deviation and Theil 
index. Indicators more sensitive to the middle part of the income distribution are the Gini 
coefficient, Atkinson’s index (α=0.5) and Theil index, while Atkinson’s index (α=1.0) and 
Mean Log Deviation are relatively more sensitive to the changes in the lower tail of the 
income distribution. The figures below show the results of the sensitivity analysis on the 
partial redistributive effects of income transfers for 4 countries (Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the United States) from around 1985 to around 2005.  
This sensitivity analysis is presented in three dimensions. The first dimension is the 
redistributive effect across countries at one moment in time, which is shown in Figure A1. 
It presents the level of redistribution in Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the 
United States around 2005. In each country, all indicators follow the same pattern; the 
largest redistribution is given by Mean Log Deviation, the lowest by the Atkinson’s index 
(α=0.5). The second dimension concerns the partial redistributive effects at one moment 
in time across countries in Figure A2. Here, we see some differences for the various 
indicators. The highest redistribution always comes from state old-age and survivors 
benefits (T4), but the share of taxes and social assistance benefits (T9+T10) slightly 
changes depending on the indicators used. Thirdly, the trends of decomposed 
redistribution are similar using different indicators in most cases, although there are 
some exceptions; see Figure A3, A4, A5 and A6. 
 
To sum up, in most cases the empirical result is not affected by using different global 
income inequality indicators. However, especially if the social program is targeted 
towards a certain group, for instance the lower tail of the income distribution, the results 
vary slightly, depending on the indicators used. 
 
Social programs presented in the Figure below are listed here: 
o T4: state old-age and survivors benefits;  
o T1+T2+T3: benefits for sickness, occupational injury and disease, and disability; 
o T9+T10: social assistance cash benefits, near-cash benefits;  
o T6: unemployment compensation benefits;  
o Other transfers (child/family benefits, maternity and other family leave benefits, 
military/veterans/war benefits, other social insurance benefits); and 
o Taxes (income taxes and mandatory payroll taxes). 
                                                 
15 Among others, see Atkinson et al (2000), Föster (2000), Hauser and Becker (1999) and Lambert 
(1993). 
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Figure A1 sensitivity analysis for partial redistributive effects around 2005 (levels) 
T4 Taxes T1+T2+T3 T9+T10 T6 Other transfers
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0.000 0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.600 0.700
Mean log deviation
Atkinson's measure (α=1)
Theil index
Gini coeff icient
Atkinson's measure (α=0.5)
 
 
Netherlands 2004
0.000 0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.600 0.700
Mean log deviation
Atkinson's measure (α=1)
Theil index
Gini coefficient
Atkinson's measure (α=0.5)
 
 
Sweden 2005
0.000 0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.600 0.700
Mean log deviation
Atkinson's measure (α=1)
Theil index
Gini coefficient
Atkinson's measure (α=0.5)
 
 
United States 2004
0.000 0.100 0.200 0.300 0.400 0.500 0.600 0.700
Mean log deviation
Atkinson's measure (α=1)
Theil index
Gini coefficient
Atkinson's measure (α=0.5)
 
 
Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011), and own calculations 
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Figure A2 sensitivity analysis for partial redistributive effects around 2005 (shares)  
T4 Taxes T1+T2+T3 T9+T10 T6 Other transfers
 
Germany 2004
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Gini coefficient
Atkinson's measure (α=0.5)
Atkinson's measure (α=1)
Mean log deviation
Theil index
 
Netherlands 2004
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Sweden 2005
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Mean log deviation
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United States 2004
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Gini coefficient
Atkinson's measure (α=0.5)
Atkinson's measure (α=1)
Mean log deviation
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Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011), and own calculations 
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Figure A3 sensitivity analysis for partial redistributive effects in Germany over time 
Gini coefficient Atkinson's measure (α=0.5) Atkinson's measure (α=1) Mean log deviation Theil index
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Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011), and own calculations 
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Figure A4 sensitivity analysis for partial redistributive effects in the Netherlands 
over time  
Gini coefficient Atkinson's measure (α=0.5) Atkinson's measure (α=1) Mean log deviation Theil index
Redistribution of state old-age and 
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Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011), and own calculations 
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Figure A5 sensitivity analysis for partial redistributive effects in Sweden over 
time  
Gini coefficient Atkinson's measure (α=0.5) Atkinson's measure (α=1) Mean log deviation Theil index
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Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011), and own calculations 
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Figure A6 sensitivity analysis for partial redistributive effects in the United 
States over time  
Gini coefficient Atkinson's measure (α=0.5) Atkinson's measure (α=1) Mean log deviation Theil index
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Annex B  Decomposition of income inequality and redistributive effect of social transfers and taxes in 20 LIS countries 
1979-2005 
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Australia 1981 0.401 0.285 0.116 29% 0.072 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.032 0.006 0.009 - 0.007 0.009 - - 0.046 - 0.046 0.001 
 1985 0.420 0.293 0.126 30% 0.072 0.002 0.002 0.008 0.033 0.006 0.012 - 0.001 0.008 - - 0.055 - 0.055 0.001 
 1989 0.432 0.307 0.126 29% 0.076 0.002 0.001 0.009 0.025 0.005 0.010 - 0.010 0.002 0.011 - 0.050 - 0.050 0.000 
 1995 0.464 0.308 0.156 34% 0.108 0.001 0.001 0.013 0.033 0.025 0.015 0.001 0.010 0.007 0.000 - 0.049 - 0.049 0.001 
 2001 0.475 0.317 0.158 33% 0.112 0.000 0.003 0.013 0.034 0.021 0.009 0.015 0.009 0.008 0.000 - 0.049 - 0.049 0.002 
 2003 0.461 0.312 0.149 32% 0.104 0.000 0.002 0.012 0.033 0.020 0.008 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.000 - 0.047 - 0.047 0.002 
Belgium 1985 0.414 0.227 0.187 45% 0.201 0.014 0.002 - 0.116 0.031 0.033 - - 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000 - - 0.014 
 1988 0.420 0.232 0.188 45% 0.202 0.014 0.002 0.003 0.116 0.029 0.036 - - 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 - - 0.015 
 1992 0.449 0.224 0.226 50% 0.171 - - 0.017 0.107 0.021 0.025 - - - 0.001 - 0.055 0.011 0.043 0.000 
 1995 0.462 0.266 0.195 42% 0.208 0.001 0.001 0.014 0.129 0.024 0.032 0.000 - - 0.005 0.001 0.000 - - 0.012 
 1997 0.481 0.250 0.231 48% 0.164 - 0.001 0.013 0.107 0.016 0.022 - - - 0.004 0.001 0.065 0.007 0.058 -0.002 
 2000 0.542 0.279 0.263 49% 0.205 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.156 0.013 0.022 0.001 - - 0.004 0.001 0.063 0.063 0.005 
Canada 1981 0.370 0.284 0.086 23% 0.059 - - - 0.027 0.005 0.009 - - 0.004 0.014 - 0.029 - 0.029 0.002 
 1987 0.393 0.288 0.105 27% 0.072 - - - 0.032 0.004 0.012 - - 0.006 0.017 - 0.035 - 0.035 0.003 
 1991 0.409 0.285 0.124 30% 0.088 - - - 0.036 0.004 0.018 - - 0.009 0.021 - 0.040 - 0.040 0.004 
 1994 0.424 0.289 0.136 32% 0.097 - - - 0.041 0.010 0.013 - - 0.010 0.023 - 0.043 - 0.043 0.004 
 1997 0.417 0.291 0.126 30% 0.088 - - - 0.043 0.010 0.008 - - 0.010 0.017 - 0.041 - 0.041 0.003 
 1998 0.442 0.311 0.132 30% 0.092 - 0.004 - 0.041 0.012 0.010 - - 0.005 0.021 - 0.043 - 0.043 0.004 
 2000 0.430 0.315 0.115 27% 0.079 - 0.003 - 0.039 0.012 0.007 - - 0.005 0.013 - 0.038 -0.002 0.040 0.001 
 2004 0.433 0.318 0.114 26% 0.079 - 0.004 - 0.038 0.012 0.009 - - 0.005 0.011 - 0.037 -0.002 0.039 0.002 
Denmark 1987 0.398 0.254 0.144 36% 0.127 0.006 - 0.019 0.051 0.006 0.019 - - 0.002 0.023 - 0.027 0.000 0.027 0.010 
 1992 0.426 0.236 0.190 45% 0.155 0.007 - 0.022 0.057 0.007 0.029 - - 0.008 0.025 - 0.045 0.000 0.045 0.011 
 1995 0.421 0.218 0.203 48% 0.175 0.007 - 0.027 0.067 0.008 0.029 0.004 - 0.005 0.017 0.010 0.041 0.000 0.041 0.013 
 2000 0.413 0.225 0.188 46% 0.150 0.006 - 0.023 0.064 0.008 0.015 0.002 0.000 0.006 0.017 0.009 0.045 0.001 0.044 0.007 
  2004 0.419 0.228 0.191 45% 0.158 0.007 - 0.024 0.066 0.008 0.015 0.003 0.000 0.008 0.017 0.010 0.041 0.000 0.041 0.009 
Note: For 12 countries full tax and benefit information is available in LIS. For other 8 countries (marked italic) net wages and salaries are used because gross 
variables are not available for all data years in LIS. 
 
Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011), and own calculations 
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Annex B  Decomposition of income inequality and redistributive effect of social transfers and taxes in 20 LIS countries 
1979-2005 (continued) 
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Finland 1987 0.332 0.209 0.123 37% 0.076 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.032 0.009 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.012 - 0.051 0.002 0.049 0.004 
 1991 0.331 0.210 0.122 37% 0.079 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.027 0.014 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.015 - 0.047 0.003 0.044 0.004 
 1995 0.384 0.217 0.168 44% 0.126 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.026 0.022 0.033 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.017 0.009 0.050 0.007 0.043 0.008 
 2000 0.460 0.246 0.214 46% 0.182 0.002 0.002 0.023 0.086 0.013 0.015 0.008 0.003 0.004 0.018 0.008 0.043 0.004 0.039 0.012 
 2004 0.464 0.252 0.212 46% 0.180 0.003 0.003 0.021 0.092 0.011 0.014 0.008 0.002 0.004 0.016 0.007 0.042 0.004 0.038 0.010 
France 1979 0.452 0.294 0.159 35% 0.129 - - - 0.079 0.020 - - - - 0.030 - 0.034 - 0.034 0.005 
 1981 0.364 0.288 0.076 21% 0.085 - - 0.003 0.010 0.023 0.007 - - 0.003 0.022 0.017 0.000 - - 0.009 
 1989 0.599 0.445 0.154 26% 0.156 - - 0.001 0.094 0.023 0.017 - - 0.004 0.003 0.014 0.004 - 0.004 0.005 
 1994 0.487 0.288 0.199 41% 0.194 0.003 - 0.010 0.117 0.021 0.015 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.017 0.018 - 0.018 0.014 
 2000 0.481 0.278 0.204 42% 0.194 0.003 - 0.007 0.113 0.020 0.015 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.013 0.017 0.022 - 0.022 0.013 
 2005 0.449 0.281 0.168 37% 0.162 0.003 - 0.006 0.084 0.019 0.016 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.012 0.016 0.017 - 0.017 0.011 
Germany 1981 0.388 0.245 0.143 37% 0.121 - 0.013 - 0.084 0.008 0.002 - 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.030 -0.002 0.031 0.008 
 1983 0.385 0.260 0.125 32% 0.100 - 0.001 0.001 0.077 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.005 - 0.026 -0.003 0.029 0.001 
 1984 0.444 0.265 0.179 40% 0.137 - - - 0.116 0.007 0.005 0.000 - - 0.006 0.003 0.041 -0.002 0.043 -0.001 
 1989 0.431 0.258 0.173 40% 0.128 - 0.001 - 0.104 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.003 - 0.004 0.003 0.044 -0.003 0.047 -0.001 
 1994 0.450 0.270 0.180 40% 0.140 - 0.002 0.007 0.098 0.006 0.011 0.003 0.002 - 0.008 0.003 0.041 0.001 0.040 0.001 
 2000 0.464 0.266 0.199 43% 0.152 - 0.001 0.011 0.105 0.012 0.009 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.003 0.049 -0.002 0.050 0.003 
 2004 0.489 0.278 0.210 43% 0.165 - 0.001 0.009 0.111 0.014 0.010 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.012 0.005 0.049 0.002 0.047 0.003 
Ireland 1987 0.500 0.328 0.172 34% 0.134 0.010 0.000 0.009 0.021 0.013 0.017 0.000 - 0.003 0.061 - 0.043 0.003 0.040 0.005 
 1994 0.502 0.333 0.169 34% 0.180 0.006 0.000 0.014 0.051 0.014 0.009 0.000 - - 0.080 0.005 0.000 - - 0.011 
 1995 0.493 0.336 0.157 32% 0.166 0.006 0.000 0.013 0.050 0.014 0.007 0.000 - - 0.071 0.005 0.000 - - 0.009 
 1996 0.483 0.325 0.158 33% 0.168 0.005 0.001 0.014 0.049 0.015 0.012 0.000 - - 0.067 0.005 0.000 - - 0.011 
 2000 0.451 0.313 0.138 31% 0.114 0.004 0.001 0.013 0.045 0.009 0.006 0.000 - - 0.035 0.002 0.000 - - -0.024 
  2004 0.490 0.312 0.178 36% 0.140 0.005 0.000 0.007 0.036 0.021 0.007 0.000 - 0.002 0.052 0.008 0.045 0.004 0.041 0.007 
Note: For 12 countries full tax and benefit information is available in LIS. For other 8 countries (marked italic) net wages and salaries are used because gross 
variables are not available for all data years in LIS. 
 
Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011), and own calculations 
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Annex B  Decomposition of income inequality and redistributive effect of social transfers and taxes in 20 LIS countries 
1979-2005 (continued) 
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Israel  1979 0.411 0.303 0.108 26% 0.055 - - 0.005 0.022 0.019 - 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.055 -0.003 0.057 0.001 
 1986 0.449 0.308 0.142 32% 0.078 - 0.000 0.009 0.027 0.024 0.003 - 0.002 0.007 0.005 0.000 0.063 0.004 0.059 -0.001 
 1992 0.443 0.305 0.138 31% 0.084 0.006 - 0.006 0.023 0.016 0.007 - - 0.020 0.006 - 0.055 0.003 0.053 0.002 
 1997 0.474 0.336 0.139 29% 0.084 - - 0.008 0.023 0.022 0.006 - - 0.017 0.008 - 0.054 0.001 0.053 -0.001 
 2001 0.506 0.346 0.160 32% 0.100 - 0.001 0.011 0.025 0.024 0.008 - 0.001 0.004 0.026 - 0.060 0.003 0.056 0.000 
 2005 0.491 0.370 0.121 25% 0.080 - 0.001 0.015 0.025 0.012 0.003 - 0.001 0.003 0.020 - 0.042 0.002 0.039 0.001 
Italy 1986 0.425 0.306 0.119 28% 0.124 - - - 0.115 - - - - 0.008 - - 0.000 - - 0.005 
 1987 0.437 0.332 0.105 24% 0.111 - 0.000 0.020 0.082 - - - 0.000 0.000 0.008 - 0.000 - - 0.006 
 1989 0.412 0.303 0.109 26% 0.115 - 0.000 0.017 0.091 - - - 0.001 0.000 0.006 - 0.000 - - 0.005 
 1991 0.395 0.290 0.105 27% 0.111 - 0.001 0.014 0.088 - - - 0.000 0.000 0.007 - 0.000 - - 0.006 
 1993 0.450 0.339 0.112 25% 0.118 - 0.001 0.012 0.094 - - - 0.000 0.000 0.011 - 0.000 - - 0.007 
 1995 0.454 0.338 0.116 26% 0.124 - 0.001 0.015 0.097 - 0.004 - 0.001 0.000 0.007 - 0.000 - - 0.008 
 1998 0.483 0.346 0.137 28% 0.146 - 0.002 0.016 0.116 - 0.003 - 0.001 0.000 0.007 - 0.000 - - 0.009 
 2000 0.477 0.333 0.143 30% 0.152 - 0.002 0.013 0.123 - 0.003 - 0.000 0.000 0.010 - 0.000 - - 0.009 
 2004 0.503 0.338 0.165 33% 0.172 - 0.002 0.007 0.143 0.005 0.003 - 0.001 0.000 0.011 - 0.000 - - 0.007 
LUX 1985 0.377 0.237 0.140 37% 0.145 0.000 0.003 0.023 0.100 0.015 0.002 0.000 - 0.001 0.002 - -0.002 -0.002 - 0.003 
 1991 0.372 0.239 0.133 36% 0.141 0.002 - 0.020 0.094 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.007 - 0.000 - - 0.007 
 1994 0.388 0.235 0.153 39% 0.161 0.001 - 0.020 0.106 0.019 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.010 - 0.000 - - 0.009 
 1997 0.400 0.260 0.140 35% 0.150 0.002 0.002 0.023 0.084 0.018 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.008 0.007 - 0.000 - - 0.010 
 2000 0.423 0.260 0.163 39% 0.173 0.001 0.003 0.022 0.111 0.021 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.007 - 0.000 - - 0.009 
 2004 0.452 0.268 0.184 41% 0.153 0.001 - 0.016 0.101 0.022 0.008 - - 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.037 - 0.037 0.006 
Mexico 1984 0.446 0.445 0.001 0% 0.001 - - 0.000 0.001 - - - - 0.000 - - 0.000 - - 0.000 
 1989 0.472 0.466 0.006 1% 0.006 - - 0.000 0.006 - - - - 0.000 - - 0.000 - - 0.000 
 1992 0.493 0.485 0.008 2% 0.008 - - 0.000 0.008 - - - - 0.000 - - 0.000 - - 0.000 
 1994 0.509 0.495 0.013 3% 0.014 - - - 0.007 - - - - 0.007 - - 0.000 - - 0.000 
 1996 0.487 0.477 0.010 2% 0.010 - - 0.000 0.006 - - - - 0.004 - - 0.000 - - 0.000 
 1998 0.503 0.492 0.010 2% 0.010 - - 0.000 0.007 - - - - 0.003 - - 0.000 - - 0.000 
 2000 0.504 0.491 0.013 3% 0.013 - - 0.000 0.006 - - - - 0.007 - - 0.000 - - 0.000 
 2002 0.490 0.471 0.019 4% 0.019 - - - 0.008 - - - - 0.003 0.009 - 0.000 - - 0.001 
  2004 0.476 0.458 0.018 4% 0.019 - - - 0.008 - - - - 0.003 0.008 - 0.000 - - 0.001 
Note: For 12 countries full tax and benefit information is available in LIS. For other 8 countries (marked italic) net wages and salaries are used because gross 
variables are not available for all data years in LIS. 
 
Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011), and own calculations 
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Annex B  Decomposition of income inequality and redistributive effect of social transfers and taxes in 20 LIS countries 
1979-2005 (continued) 
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Netherl. 1983 0.435 0.260 0.176 40% 0.143 - - 0.032 0.049 0.013 0.021 - - 0.005 0.022 - 0.032 0.003 0.028 -0.001 
 1987 0.440 0.256 0.184 42% 0.146 - - 0.034 0.046 0.011 0.013 - - 0.006 0.028 0.009 0.039 0.002 0.037 0.001 
 1991 0.405 0.266 0.139 34% 0.130 0.003 - 0.028 0.051 0.010 0.010 - - 0.000 0.018 0.009 0.020 - 0.020 0.012 
 1994 0.420 0.257 0.162 39% 0.126 0.002 - 0.032 0.049 0.011 0.009 - - 0.000 0.018 0.006 0.033 -0.004 0.037 -0.004 
 1999 0.373 0.231 0.142 38% 0.101 0.001 - 0.022 0.051 0.008 0.004 - - 0.000 0.010 0.004 0.036 0.001 0.035 -0.006 
 2004 0.459 0.263 0.196 43% 0.163 0.002 - 0.018 0.098 0.006 0.010 - - 0.003 0.020 0.006 0.040 - 0.040 0.008 
Norway 1979 0.364 0.223 0.141 39% 0.092 - 0.083 - - 0.007 - - - - - 0.002 0.047 0.005 0.042 -0.002 
 1986 0.352 0.233 0.119 34% 0.092 - 0.076 - - 0.008 0.002 - - 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.029 0.005 0.024 0.002 
 1991 0.374 0.231 0.142 38% 0.107 - - 0.019 0.065 0.012 - - - 0.002 0.007 0.001 0.037 0.005 0.032 0.001 
 1995 0.400 0.238 0.162 41% 0.128 - - 0.020 0.069 0.013 0.010 0.001 - 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.037 0.006 0.031 0.003 
 2000 0.402 0.250 0.152 38% 0.120 0.007 0.001 0.024 0.057 0.010 0.005 0.008 - 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.035 0.003 0.031 0.002 
 2004 0.430 0.256 0.174 41% 0.149 0.024 0.000 0.028 0.056 0.012 0.007 0.009 - 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.032 0.003 0.030 0.007 
Poland 1986 0.365 0.271 0.094 26% 0.099 - 0.000 0.025 0.054 0.002 - 0.001 - 0.017 - - 0.000 - - 0.005 
 1992 0.414 0.274 0.141 34% 0.148 - - - 0.099 0.021 0.028 0.001 - - - - 0.000 - - 0.008 
 1995 0.527 0.318 0.208 40% 0.235 - - 0.080 0.100 0.019 0.022 0.000 - 0.002 0.011 - -0.009 - -0.009 0.017 
 1999 0.475 0.289 0.186 39% 0.197 0.001 - 0.054 0.113 0.010 0.010 0.002 - 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.017 
 2004 0.527 0.320 0.207 39% 0.220 0.001 - 0.048 0.138 0.015 0.007 0.002 - - 0.009 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.018 
Spain 1980 0.416 0.318 0.098 24% 0.098 - - - - - - - - 0.098 - - 0.000 - - 0.000 
 1990 0.420 0.303 0.117 28% 0.125 - - 0.019 0.081 - 0.016 - - 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.000 - - 0.007 
 1995 0.501 0.353 0.148 29% 0.157 0.004 0.001 0.020 0.104 0.003 0.010 0.000 - 0.002 0.013 0.000 0.000 - - 0.009 
 2000 0.541 0.336 0.205 38% 0.182 0.001 0.000 0.017 0.143 0.001 0.005 0.000 - 0.001 0.013 0.000 0.000 - - -0.024 
 2004 0.441 0.315 0.126 29% 0.130 0.003 - 0.009 0.105 0.001 0.011 - - 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 - 0.001 0.005 
Sweden 1981 0.411 0.197 0.214 52% 0.185 0.012 - - 0.118 0.007 0.006 0.005 - 0.002 0.006 0.029 0.047 -0.003 0.050 0.017 
 1987 0.428 0.218 0.211 49% 0.184 0.016 - - 0.126 0.008 0.010 0.008 - 0.001 0.015 0.000 0.042 -0.002 0.044 0.015 
 1992 0.462 0.229 0.232 50% 0.217 0.013 - - 0.122 0.011 0.026 0.011 - 0.005 0.008 0.021 0.031 - 0.031 0.016 
 1995 0.460 0.221 0.239 52% 0.221 0.009 - 0.001 0.093 0.011 0.033 0.010 - 0.026 0.012 0.025 0.041 - 0.041 0.023 
 2000 0.448 0.252 0.196 44% 0.173 0.014 0.002 0.018 0.076 0.010 0.019 0.006 - 0.007 0.008 0.012 0.034 0.001 0.033 0.011 
  2005 0.442 0.237 0.205 46% 0.184 0.012 0.002 0.022 0.082 0.009 0.017 0.009 - 0.013 0.008 0.010 0.034 0.001 0.033 0.013 
Note: For 12 countries full tax and benefit information is available in LIS. For other 8 countries (marked italic) net wages and salaries are used because gross 
variables are not available for all data years in LIS. 
 
Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011), and own calculations 
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Annex B  Decomposition of income inequality and redistributive effect of social transfers and taxes in 20 LIS countries 
1979-2005 (final) 
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Switzerl. 1982 0.381 0.309 0.071 19% 0.053 - - 0.005 0.044 - 0.001 - 0.000 0.002 0.002 - 0.017 0.000 0.017 -0.001 
 1992 0.376 0.307 0.068 18% 0.057 0.001 - 0.000 0.044 - 0.003 - 0.000 - 0.006 0.001 0.015 -0.002 0.016 0.003 
 2000 0.386 0.280 0.106 28% 0.112 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.090 0.006 0.004 - 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.000 -0.002 -0.010 0.008 0.003 
 2002 0.393 0.274 0.119 30% 0.119 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.096 0.006 0.005 - 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.001 -0.009 0.010 0.001 
 2004 0.395 0.268 0.128 32% 0.134 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.103 0.006 0.010 - 0.000 0.001 0.010 0.000 -0.003 -0.011 0.008 0.003 
UK 1979 0.396 0.270 0.126 32% 0.105 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.048 0.014 0.007 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.018 0.004 0.027 0.003 0.023 0.006 
 1986 0.476 0.303 0.173 36% 0.147 0.002 0.001 0.012 0.049 0.016 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.041 0.013 0.035 0.005 0.030 0.009 
 1991 0.475 0.336 0.139 29% 0.113 0.001 0.001 0.014 0.041 0.009 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.039 0.000 0.037 0.006 0.031 0.011 
 1994 0.502 0.339 0.163 32% 0.143 0.000 0.001 0.020 0.043 0.011 0.003 - 0.001 0.004 0.033 0.028 0.028 0.004 0.024 0.008 
 1995 0.503 0.344 0.158 32% 0.132 0.002 0.001 0.014 0.040 0.012 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.035 0.022 0.036 0.006 0.030 0.009 
 1999 0.497 0.347 0.150 30% 0.133 0.000 0.001 0.020 0.042 0.010 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.030 0.025 0.024 0.003 0.021 0.007 
 2004 0.490 0.345 0.145 30% 0.133 0.000 0.001 0.018 0.041 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.036 0.023 0.021 0.004 0.016 0.008 
USA 1979 0.405 0.305 0.100 25% 0.054 - 0.001 0.005 0.026 - 0.002 - 0.004 - 0.012 0.004 0.046 0.000 0.046 -0.001 
 1986 0.434 0.338 0.096 22% 0.054 - 0.002 - 0.034 - 0.002 - 0.002 - 0.011 0.004 0.041 0.000 0.041 -0.001 
 1991 0.439 0.338 0.101 23% 0.060 - 0.002 - 0.035 - 0.003 - 0.002 - 0.013 0.005 0.040 0.001 0.038 -0.001 
 1994 0.473 0.365 0.108 23% 0.064 0.000 - 0.002 0.037 - 0.002 - 0.001 0.003 0.011 0.007 0.043 0.001 0.043 -0.001 
 1997 0.476 0.372 0.103 22% 0.060 - - 0.001 0.038 - 0.002 - 0.002 - 0.013 0.005 0.042 -0.001 0.043 -0.001 
 2000 0.473 0.368 0.105 22% 0.057 - 0.001 0.005 0.034 0.000 0.001 - 0.002 0.000 0.010 0.003 0.047 -0.001 0.048 -0.001 
  2004 0.482 0.372 0.109 23% 0.068 - 0.001 0.007 0.037 0.000 0.002 - 0.002 0.000 0.014 0.005 0.041 0.000 0.041 0.000 
20 country-average                                       
around 1985 0.412 0.285 0.128 31% 0.106 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.051 0.009 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.012 0.002 0.025 0.001 0.025 0.004 
around 1995 0.452 0.299 0.153 34% 0.136 0.002 0.000 0.015 0.066 0.012 0.013 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.014 0.006 0.025 0.001 0.024 0.007 
around 2005 0.467 0.304 0.163 35% 0.140 0.003 0.001 0.014 0.078 0.011 0.009 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.014 0.005 0.029 0.004 0.027 0.006 
12 country-average                         
around 1985 0.412 0.273 0.139 34% 0.103 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.049 0.008 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.013 0.002 0.039 0.001 0.038 0.003 
around 1995 0.437 0.281 0.157 36% 0.121 0.002 0.000 0.010 0.052 0.012 0.014 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.014 0.007 0.040 0.001 0.039 0.005 
around 2005 0.454 0.292 0.163 36% 0.133 0.004 0.001 0.015 0.065 0.010 0.009 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.014 0.006 0.035 0.000 0.035 0.005 
8 country-average                         
around 1985 0.413 0.303 0.111 27% 0.111 0.003 0.001 0.007 0.052 0.010 0.007 0.000 - 0.016 0.011 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.005 
around 1995 0.475 0.327 0.148 31% 0.157 0.002 0.000 0.021 0.089 0.013 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.015 0.003 0.001 - 0.001 0.010 
around 2005  0.485 0.321 0.164 33% 0.150 0.002 0.000 0.012 0.096 0.012 0.009 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.013 0.003 0.021 0.008 0.014 0.007 
Note: For 12 countries full tax and benefit information is available in LIS. For other 8 countries (marked italic) net wages and salaries are used because gross 
variables are not available for all data years in LIS. 
 
Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011), and own calculations 
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Annex C  Trends in redistributive effect of social transfers (shares) in 20 
countries 1979-2005 
 
The Figure below presents country specific profiles for all 20 LIS countries, and for all 
data years available between 1979 and 2005. In this Annex B, we focus on only six main 
social transfer schemes (child/family benefits, disability benefits, unemployment 
compensation benefits, sickness benefits, social assistance cash benefits and state old 
age and survivors benefits), because the remaining transfers attribute for a small share 
to total redistribution. Moreover, also taxes are taken into consideration. 
We use the partial redistributive effect for transfers and taxes from Annex A. A sequential 
budget incidence technique will compute the partial redistributive effect of a specific 
social transfer highest (smallest) as the first (last) social program. The partial effects of 
these transfers in total redistribution could be computed in several orders. We consider 
every specific social transfer as the first program to be added to primary income 
distribution, and every direct tax as the first tax to be subtracted from gross income. In 
that case, the sum of all partial redistributive effects amount (a little) over or less than 
100 percent. We rescaled all redistributive effects of each program by applying an 
adjustment factor, which is defined as the overall redistribution divided by sum of all 
partial redistributive effects of all programs (over or less than 100%), in order to correct 
for an over- or underestimated effect. 
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Note: For 12 countries full tax and benefit information is available in LIS. For other 8 countries (marked 
italic) net wages and salaries are used because gross variables are not available for all data years in LIS. 
 
Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011), and own calculations 
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Annex C  Trends in redistributive effect of social transfers (shares) in 20 
countries 1979-2005 (continued) 
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Note: For 12 countries full tax and benefit information is available in LIS. For other 8 countries (marked 
italic) net wages and salaries are used because gross variables are not available for all data years in LIS. 
 
Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011), and own calculations
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Annex C  Trends in redistributive effect of social transfers (shares) in 20  
  countries 1979-2005 (continued) 
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Note: For 12 countries full tax and benefit information is available in LIS. For other 8 countries (marked 
italic) net wages and salaries are used because gross variables are not available for all data years in LIS. 
 
Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011), and own calculations 
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Annex C  Trends in redistributive effect of social transfers (shares) in 20 
countries 1979-2005 (final) 
0%
50%
197 9 19 80 198 1 1 982 1 983 198 4 1 985 198 6 1 987 1 988 198 9 199 0 199 1 199 2 1 993 199 4 19 95 1996 199 7 19 98 1999 2 000 2001 2 002 2003 2004 2005
T1 Sickness benefits T3 Disability benefits
T4 State old-age and survivors benefits T5 Child/family benefits
T6 Unemployment compensation benefits T10 Social assistance cash benefits
Other social  benefits (T2+T7+T8+T9+T11) Taxes (T12+T13)
Poland
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
5
Spain
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
5
Sweden
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
5
 
Switzerland
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
5
 
United Kingdom
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
5
 
United States
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
5
 
Note: For 12 countries full tax and benefit information is available in LIS. For other 8 countries (marked 
italic) net wages and salaries are used because gross variables are not available for all data years in LIS. 
 
Source: Database Wang and Caminada (2011), and own calculations 
